The readings this week all focused on the debate of United States Grand Strategy. Now more than ever, the grand strategy of the United States is critical in order for it to maintain its position as an unrivaled hegemon in the future. What makes the debate more heated today is that the United States hegemonic power position has never been seen before in history. The US out spends the next six powerful states combined in military and faces no real threat from any other state. The United States has been able to maintain the current status quo because it has historically been able to check its own power and has been seen as a “benevolent hegemon” (Kristol and Kagan, 2) with an emphasis on morality and protecting the autonomy of other states.
However, there have been new concerns about US grand strategy post 9/11 and the war in Iraq. One of the major concerns is whether a more unilateralist approach to international affairs is a wise one. Bush’s speech after the 9/11 attacks implied that the United States would fight against terrorism, regardless of if they had to do it alone. Critics to unilateralism argue that this approach may leave other states feeling threatened by US power and result in an increased effort to check US power. Other critics argue that a unilateral approach will hurt US aims in the long run because multilateral institutions are needed by hegemons to secure cooperation from other states. As the US leads a crusade against terrorism, cooperation and support from other powerful states would make this effort more successful.
I feel that increased unilateralism for the US does have its benefits; however, it would be unwise for the United States to completely alienate its commitments to international institutions. As NATO involvement in Kosovo proved, sometimes it is necessary to do things alone in order to get them right. Also, terrorist don’t play by the rules, so the US may have to bend some in order to defeat the enemy.
But if the United States abandons the same policies that help it maintain its continued hegemony, then other states are likely to react adversely. Soft balancing and anti-American tendencies in international institutions seem to be the most likely ways that other states would show their resentment to US unilateralism.
21 February 2008
Is terrorism a friend or foe of the unipolar system?
As we listen to politicians, presidential candidates, and radio talk show hosts talk about terrorism, we often hear about the threat to United States and world security. Clearly, terrorist attacks destroy lives and are unpredictable enough to cause security concerns. Is it possible, however, that ultimately the threat of global terrorism adds stability to the international order with the United States as a hegemon?
The three main schools in international relations theory, in their traditional senses, have all been formulated around historical examples and trends observed over time. Transnational terrorist threats, however, pose a new threat that has the potential to change trends in the world. The actual size of the threat is irrelevant; rather, the perception on the part of potential peer challengers that terrorism is the biggest threat to the world order might allow for some prolonging of the United States position as hegemon. The rise of the power of transnational terrorist movements, or even just the perception of this rise, increases the attractiveness of free-riding. Simultaneously, military officials in potential power peers of the US mostly face the same threats of terrorism, and states will for the most part want to divert more resources to defending against potential terrorist threats than towards challenging the position of the United States. After the Cold War, it may have seemed as if states, no longer flocking to superpowers against a common enemy, would balance the unipolar system. The rise of terrorism, however, has posed a new common enemy that is more likely to provoke bandwagoning and a bolstering of US power, even as it acts unilaterally and undermines the international system it has helped to create.
I think that the hot topic of terrorism has indeed assured the United States’ position as the hegemon in a unipolar system. Though a tendency towards balancing or towards increased revisionism among potential peer states may have been likely in the aftermath of the Cold War, fear now allows powerful nations to accept the leadership of the United States. In this environment, the United States can ignore international institutions and norms with fewer consequences than before. Sure, other nations will react negatively to American use of torture and to blatant disregard of UN resolutions, but no one with the ability to do so will attempt to challenge the US’s hegemony unless it wants to give up free-riding and take on the position of leader against terrorism, which is highly unlikely given the nature of terrorism. Terrorists are difficult to detect and target, unlike states that, in the past, posed the chief military challenges. Especially as a relatively new concern, leading the fight against such terrorism calls for many resources that no state that gets them for free would really want to take on. Interests against terrorism will cause the United States to carry more weight in international relations as, say, China, a nation much less obsessed with terrorism, and therefore, the unipolar system will be maintained for at least some period of time longer than it would without the terrorist threat.
Ikenberry’s writings clearly oppose unilateral action on the part of the Bush administration. I do not support unilateralism, but I disagree that it will be the demise of the United States within the near future. Ikenberry seems to relate popularity and power in an inaccurarte way. The actions of the United States might not be popular in the world, but most states will not actively challenge the US through force and challenge its power as long as the option of free-riding in the face of terrorism is still an option. Additionally, it is possible that the expectations of legitimacy that Ikenberry sees as acquired through adherence to international institutions can be acquired through protection against terrorism. Since terrorism is currently perceived as a major threat (more so, in my opinion, than it actual is), states might accept the legitimacy of the United States if it proves able and committed to working against terrorism Just as the 1982 invasion of the Falklands islands led colonies to cease efforts towards independence, states weaker than the United States who would have potentially seeked to change the status quo will not because of fears of terrorism and guarantees that the United States foreign policy is currently dedicated to mitigating terrorism.
This, of course, leaves out weaker states that may see the Bush administration’s obsession with terrorism as a threat. States that cannot control terrorist groups within their borders might see the United States’ willingness to attack as a threat and, therefore, balancing will take place as a response; nevertheless, the states in question are weak states and would probably be unable to coordinate well or challenge the US effectively if they can’t control domestic affairs.
The three main schools in international relations theory, in their traditional senses, have all been formulated around historical examples and trends observed over time. Transnational terrorist threats, however, pose a new threat that has the potential to change trends in the world. The actual size of the threat is irrelevant; rather, the perception on the part of potential peer challengers that terrorism is the biggest threat to the world order might allow for some prolonging of the United States position as hegemon. The rise of the power of transnational terrorist movements, or even just the perception of this rise, increases the attractiveness of free-riding. Simultaneously, military officials in potential power peers of the US mostly face the same threats of terrorism, and states will for the most part want to divert more resources to defending against potential terrorist threats than towards challenging the position of the United States. After the Cold War, it may have seemed as if states, no longer flocking to superpowers against a common enemy, would balance the unipolar system. The rise of terrorism, however, has posed a new common enemy that is more likely to provoke bandwagoning and a bolstering of US power, even as it acts unilaterally and undermines the international system it has helped to create.
I think that the hot topic of terrorism has indeed assured the United States’ position as the hegemon in a unipolar system. Though a tendency towards balancing or towards increased revisionism among potential peer states may have been likely in the aftermath of the Cold War, fear now allows powerful nations to accept the leadership of the United States. In this environment, the United States can ignore international institutions and norms with fewer consequences than before. Sure, other nations will react negatively to American use of torture and to blatant disregard of UN resolutions, but no one with the ability to do so will attempt to challenge the US’s hegemony unless it wants to give up free-riding and take on the position of leader against terrorism, which is highly unlikely given the nature of terrorism. Terrorists are difficult to detect and target, unlike states that, in the past, posed the chief military challenges. Especially as a relatively new concern, leading the fight against such terrorism calls for many resources that no state that gets them for free would really want to take on. Interests against terrorism will cause the United States to carry more weight in international relations as, say, China, a nation much less obsessed with terrorism, and therefore, the unipolar system will be maintained for at least some period of time longer than it would without the terrorist threat.
Ikenberry’s writings clearly oppose unilateral action on the part of the Bush administration. I do not support unilateralism, but I disagree that it will be the demise of the United States within the near future. Ikenberry seems to relate popularity and power in an inaccurarte way. The actions of the United States might not be popular in the world, but most states will not actively challenge the US through force and challenge its power as long as the option of free-riding in the face of terrorism is still an option. Additionally, it is possible that the expectations of legitimacy that Ikenberry sees as acquired through adherence to international institutions can be acquired through protection against terrorism. Since terrorism is currently perceived as a major threat (more so, in my opinion, than it actual is), states might accept the legitimacy of the United States if it proves able and committed to working against terrorism Just as the 1982 invasion of the Falklands islands led colonies to cease efforts towards independence, states weaker than the United States who would have potentially seeked to change the status quo will not because of fears of terrorism and guarantees that the United States foreign policy is currently dedicated to mitigating terrorism.
This, of course, leaves out weaker states that may see the Bush administration’s obsession with terrorism as a threat. States that cannot control terrorist groups within their borders might see the United States’ willingness to attack as a threat and, therefore, balancing will take place as a response; nevertheless, the states in question are weak states and would probably be unable to coordinate well or challenge the US effectively if they can’t control domestic affairs.
20 February 2008
Review Sessions
19 February 2008
2008 election
As I watch the primaries and all of the debating and campaigning that goes along with the major contests, I have been most curious about the candidates’ stances on foreign policy. All of them send somewhat mixed messages about the need for a new grand strategy and the future role of America in other countries. Senator John McCain’s campaign site has several instances of his realist platform regarding Iraq:
“In a dangerous world, protecting America's national security requires a strong military.”
“The global war on terrorism, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, threats from rogue states like Iran and North Korea, and the rise of potential strategic competitors like China and Russia mean that America requires a larger and more capable military to protect our country's vital interests and deter challenges to our security.”
However, his site also speaks of the importance of “working with friends and partners overseas, from Africa to Southeast Asia, to help them combat terrorism and violent insurgencies in their own countries…[and] maintaining the credibility of our defense commitments to our allies” – clearly a liberal view. The site even says, “John McCain believes that just as America must be prepared to meet and prevail against any adversary on the field of battle, we must engage and prevail against them on the battleground of ideas.” This sounds like a line directly from constructivist theory.
How do the various candidates’ stances on foreign policy conform to the schools of thought we have studied? And more importantly, which camp best describes how Americans feel right now? Will it be to candidates’ advantages to take up a new, more pragmatic realist perspective, to continue the Bush administration’s liberal campaign of expansion and hegemony, or to insist on international cooperation and the growth of American soft power on a constructivist basis?
Continuing our grand strategy strictly along Bush’s lines would clearly be a bad choice. Americans are frustrated by the stagnation of our campaign in Iraq, and most want either a withdrawal of troops or an increase in the number of troops to ensure that the enemy is defeated for good. But each IR perspective has a strong following among voters, and all for good reason.
A more restricted realist approach would prescribe a continued military buildup, but would also limit conflicts and interference in other countries to cases in which US interests are directly threatened. Liberal institutional or complex interdependence theories would lead us to reverse the trend of disregarding international institutions and work more closely with other liberal democracies. A constructivist approach would encourage the US to build soft power and trust with others, probably by limiting our military involvement, forming more alliances and international institutions, and aiding in development and the growth of free markets and democracy worldwide.
In this election, America faces a choice between a variety of new grand strategies that could continue US hegemony, weaken our power, or even increase it. The difficulty is figuring out which strategy would be most helpful to our interests. The decision rests on a number of factors that are hard to determine, including whether others view us as a revisionist or status quo state, how threatened others are by our military capabilities (versus our military policies), and whether balancing of any type is taking place or is imminent. Any candidate who could illuminate these issues and explain how their foreign policy platform would help maintain US hegemony without alienating others would gain an advantage in the 2008 election.
18 February 2008
The Rise of China
Reading John Ikenberry's, "The Rise of China and the Future of the West" was a fascinating and very pertinent read, considering the implications that China and India will at least economically overcome the U.S. in this next century and present a power shift that we have never seen before. Thinking back to my last visit in China, which was in 2005, I remember being astonished at the amount of progress this country has made in the last two decades. There was a curious juxtaposition of the West and East on every street corner, ranging from old farmers selling fruit and vegetables in wooden vendors to the impressive steel skyscrapers gently settling the background behind them. Anyone who suggests that China is still a communist country is greatly mistaken and completely behind the times--the Communist Party more or less acts as the club that everyone must join in order to get anywhere in the upper echelons of society, not an anti-democratic, anti-Western red scare that some still paint it out to be.
Given China's bold free-market stance and inability to acquiesce the West's demands to denounce civil rights violations, it's interesting to watch the progression of Chinese politics nervously tiptoe around the issues that matter to the West. As we talked about in discussion section, Western countries could use the international institutions that best represent Western (the IMF, UN Security Council, World Bank...) as leverages for forcing China to comply with certain policies, such as fair labor practices. The article mentions that the West can only triumph if the system is revised to meet the needs of the 21st century, and this view parallels the similar argument made in, "An Empire, if You Can Keep It" by Steve Rosen. The U.S. can only maintain hierarchy by embracing new technology and organization advantages, and I don't believe that military power alone can stabilize a hegemony: economic prowess and domestic political stability are key factors in keeping a global superpower the sole superpower, or at least ensuring that it doesn't completely fall behind.
However, the article acknowledges that the West, with its "nondiscrimination and market openness," coalition-based leadership, and recognized system of rules and institutions allow it to ease China into a liberal international order. Perhaps liberals and constructivists are more accurate in a sense that they recognize that power-maximization can be overcome through global institutions and recognizing state identities, not just power shifts alone. People argue for trade barriers in China because the Chinese government is, ahem, rather lax when it comes to ensuring civil rights, but democracy and order cannot be fostered within a few years or even a few decades--as China emerges as a world power, it will be forced to join the WTO and eventually adhere to the rules that have shaped every other developed country. In the future, China must also grant democratic rights to its people in order to succeed within the international market. Thousands of years of Chinese culture will slowly transform to accommodate these "new" Western ideas of equality and liberty, as they realize that successful markets are the ones that don't discriminate.
And what about the US? The article mentions that the US must go back and rebuild support for multilateral institutions (in great contrast to the blatant unilateralism that the Bush Administration has provoked these past eight years). It also mentions that the US must put in (presumably) domestic institutions that "safeguard a person's interests regardless of whether he is rich or poor, weak or strong." To me, this advice suggests that individual decision-makers and domestic politics will greatly determine whether the US can compete with China on a global scale in the next ten, twenty, or fifty years. To do so, we must address the issues that will propel younger generations to behave as global citizens in addition to US citizens. Major public education reforms must come to pass, and encouragement of R&D as well as environmental protection policies can ensure that the US will be ready for a shift in power, no matter how severe, and that we can ease into this century with stability and readiness rather than with chaos and struggle.
Given China's bold free-market stance and inability to acquiesce the West's demands to denounce civil rights violations, it's interesting to watch the progression of Chinese politics nervously tiptoe around the issues that matter to the West. As we talked about in discussion section, Western countries could use the international institutions that best represent Western (the IMF, UN Security Council, World Bank...) as leverages for forcing China to comply with certain policies, such as fair labor practices. The article mentions that the West can only triumph if the system is revised to meet the needs of the 21st century, and this view parallels the similar argument made in, "An Empire, if You Can Keep It" by Steve Rosen. The U.S. can only maintain hierarchy by embracing new technology and organization advantages, and I don't believe that military power alone can stabilize a hegemony: economic prowess and domestic political stability are key factors in keeping a global superpower the sole superpower, or at least ensuring that it doesn't completely fall behind.
However, the article acknowledges that the West, with its "nondiscrimination and market openness," coalition-based leadership, and recognized system of rules and institutions allow it to ease China into a liberal international order. Perhaps liberals and constructivists are more accurate in a sense that they recognize that power-maximization can be overcome through global institutions and recognizing state identities, not just power shifts alone. People argue for trade barriers in China because the Chinese government is, ahem, rather lax when it comes to ensuring civil rights, but democracy and order cannot be fostered within a few years or even a few decades--as China emerges as a world power, it will be forced to join the WTO and eventually adhere to the rules that have shaped every other developed country. In the future, China must also grant democratic rights to its people in order to succeed within the international market. Thousands of years of Chinese culture will slowly transform to accommodate these "new" Western ideas of equality and liberty, as they realize that successful markets are the ones that don't discriminate.
And what about the US? The article mentions that the US must go back and rebuild support for multilateral institutions (in great contrast to the blatant unilateralism that the Bush Administration has provoked these past eight years). It also mentions that the US must put in (presumably) domestic institutions that "safeguard a person's interests regardless of whether he is rich or poor, weak or strong." To me, this advice suggests that individual decision-makers and domestic politics will greatly determine whether the US can compete with China on a global scale in the next ten, twenty, or fifty years. To do so, we must address the issues that will propel younger generations to behave as global citizens in addition to US citizens. Major public education reforms must come to pass, and encouragement of R&D as well as environmental protection policies can ensure that the US will be ready for a shift in power, no matter how severe, and that we can ease into this century with stability and readiness rather than with chaos and struggle.
14 February 2008
Hegemonic Stability and Power Transition Theory
The assigned readings for this week this week examined Hegemonic-Stability Theory and Power-Transition Theory.
Hegemonic Stability Theory basically states that world order is determined by a single dominant power. According to the Keohane article, international regimes are usually formed by hegemonies. In order for world order to be maintained, hegemonies must remain in power. In order for hegemonies to remain in power, they must remain in control of raw materials, sources of capitols, control over markets, and the competitive advantages in production of important goods. I agree that control of these resources develops a hegemon, however, I am not sure that Hegemony is the most important force in maintaining world order. I feel that in order for order to be maintained, a dominant state must have enough power and influence to deter other states from taking aggressive aims towards them and to ensure that international regimes fall into their favor. Hegemonic Stability Theory seems to be a realistic model; however, I agree with Keohane that there are not enough examples in history to test the strength of the theory. I also agree that a hegemon is not necessary for international cooperation.
Power Transition Theory was developed to explain the origin of wars and implies that states operate in a hierarchical order. According to the theory, wars occur when a state that is dissatisfied with the current status quo reaches power equivalent to the dominant state. So that according to the theory, periods of bi-polarity or multipolarity are war-prone. This directly contrasts with balance of power theory that mulipolar systems are the most stable. Also according to power transition theory, wars among great powers are most likely to be fought for control over the international status quo. If this is the case, do proponents of the theory feel that the most stable and desirable state in international relations is a unipolar system? I also agree with critics about the “powerful-therefore satisfied problem.” If a dominant power is concerned about the potential threat of a dissatisfied state, then why doesn’t the dominant state simply crush the threat?
Hegemonic Stability Theory basically states that world order is determined by a single dominant power. According to the Keohane article, international regimes are usually formed by hegemonies. In order for world order to be maintained, hegemonies must remain in power. In order for hegemonies to remain in power, they must remain in control of raw materials, sources of capitols, control over markets, and the competitive advantages in production of important goods. I agree that control of these resources develops a hegemon, however, I am not sure that Hegemony is the most important force in maintaining world order. I feel that in order for order to be maintained, a dominant state must have enough power and influence to deter other states from taking aggressive aims towards them and to ensure that international regimes fall into their favor. Hegemonic Stability Theory seems to be a realistic model; however, I agree with Keohane that there are not enough examples in history to test the strength of the theory. I also agree that a hegemon is not necessary for international cooperation.
Power Transition Theory was developed to explain the origin of wars and implies that states operate in a hierarchical order. According to the theory, wars occur when a state that is dissatisfied with the current status quo reaches power equivalent to the dominant state. So that according to the theory, periods of bi-polarity or multipolarity are war-prone. This directly contrasts with balance of power theory that mulipolar systems are the most stable. Also according to power transition theory, wars among great powers are most likely to be fought for control over the international status quo. If this is the case, do proponents of the theory feel that the most stable and desirable state in international relations is a unipolar system? I also agree with critics about the “powerful-therefore satisfied problem.” If a dominant power is concerned about the potential threat of a dissatisfied state, then why doesn’t the dominant state simply crush the threat?
American Empire Debate...A Response to the Readings
Is America an Empire? This week’s readings tackle this question and examine two sides of the much debated argument. After reading Rosen’s “An Empire, If You Can Keep It,” I was frustrated by his use of historical examples to prove that America, in his opinion, is an Empire. Citing British or Ottoman imperial control in relation to the current international system, imperial or not, seems invalid and unrelated, as each imperial system (as indicated by Nexon and Wright) is different. Professor Nexon’s and Thomas Wright’s “What’s at Stake in the American Empire Debate” is refreshing as it highlights the major differences between unipolarity, hegemony, and imperial order (while Rosen’s piece failed to acknowledge these discrepancies). The debate presented in both articles and in political discourse at large shows that the answer to the question posed at the start of this post will vary depending on how one defines “empire.”
I have always considered a more traditional definition of empire (Merriam Webster’s dictionary defines it as “a major political unit having a territory of great extent or a number of territories or peoples under a single sovereign authority; especially : one having an emperor as chief of state”) in which a central power aggressively conquers foreign lands and rules them either through indirect or direct rule. The key word here is conquest, and when applying this definition to the American empire debate, I do not believe the USA has the intent of physically conquering foreign lands and imposing American rule upon them. Although the US military is superior to any other states’, I honestly believe that our overpowering military is mainly for assurance of national security. This aim to preserve national security has manifested itself in a way that makes the US seem like the “schoolyard bully,” intimidating the rest of the world into submission whether through anticommunist agendas or the “War on Terror,” for example.
Clearly, Iraq is the most relevant contemporary example of the US militarily exerting control abroad, but regardless of one’s political opinion concerning the war, I think it is safe to say that the US is not looking to make Iraq another Puerto Rico. I would go as far to say that at this point, the US would like to have the Iraq “problem” taken off its hands, as our military resources are running thin and we continue to fight an invisible and tricky enemy.
I do think that the USA is the world hegemon, but I do not think it’s accurate to characterize it an empire. The USA’s goal is to preserve its national security and “seek peace and prosperity among sovereign states rather than the annexation and direct domination of independent politities” (Nexon and Wright).
I have always considered a more traditional definition of empire (Merriam Webster’s dictionary defines it as “a major political unit having a territory of great extent or a number of territories or peoples under a single sovereign authority; especially : one having an emperor as chief of state”) in which a central power aggressively conquers foreign lands and rules them either through indirect or direct rule. The key word here is conquest, and when applying this definition to the American empire debate, I do not believe the USA has the intent of physically conquering foreign lands and imposing American rule upon them. Although the US military is superior to any other states’, I honestly believe that our overpowering military is mainly for assurance of national security. This aim to preserve national security has manifested itself in a way that makes the US seem like the “schoolyard bully,” intimidating the rest of the world into submission whether through anticommunist agendas or the “War on Terror,” for example.
Clearly, Iraq is the most relevant contemporary example of the US militarily exerting control abroad, but regardless of one’s political opinion concerning the war, I think it is safe to say that the US is not looking to make Iraq another Puerto Rico. I would go as far to say that at this point, the US would like to have the Iraq “problem” taken off its hands, as our military resources are running thin and we continue to fight an invisible and tricky enemy.
I do think that the USA is the world hegemon, but I do not think it’s accurate to characterize it an empire. The USA’s goal is to preserve its national security and “seek peace and prosperity among sovereign states rather than the annexation and direct domination of independent politities” (Nexon and Wright).
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