Hegemonic Stability and Power Transition Theory

The assigned readings for this week this week examined Hegemonic-Stability Theory and Power-Transition Theory.
Hegemonic Stability Theory basically states that world order is determined by a single dominant power. According to the Keohane article, international regimes are usually formed by hegemonies. In order for world order to be maintained, hegemonies must remain in power. In order for hegemonies to remain in power, they must remain in control of raw materials, sources of capitols, control over markets, and the competitive advantages in production of important goods. I agree that control of these resources develops a hegemon, however, I am not sure that Hegemony is the most important force in maintaining world order. I feel that in order for order to be maintained, a dominant state must have enough power and influence to deter other states from taking aggressive aims towards them and to ensure that international regimes fall into their favor. Hegemonic Stability Theory seems to be a realistic model; however, I agree with Keohane that there are not enough examples in history to test the strength of the theory. I also agree that a hegemon is not necessary for international cooperation.
Power Transition Theory was developed to explain the origin of wars and implies that states operate in a hierarchical order. According to the theory, wars occur when a state that is dissatisfied with the current status quo reaches power equivalent to the dominant state. So that according to the theory, periods of bi-polarity or multipolarity are war-prone. This directly contrasts with balance of power theory that mulipolar systems are the most stable. Also according to power transition theory, wars among great powers are most likely to be fought for control over the international status quo. If this is the case, do proponents of the theory feel that the most stable and desirable state in international relations is a unipolar system? I also agree with critics about the “powerful-therefore satisfied problem.” If a dominant power is concerned about the potential threat of a dissatisfied state, then why doesn’t the dominant state simply crush the threat?