Is terrorism a friend or foe of the unipolar system?

As we listen to politicians, presidential candidates, and radio talk show hosts talk about terrorism, we often hear about the threat to United States and world security. Clearly, terrorist attacks destroy lives and are unpredictable enough to cause security concerns. Is it possible, however, that ultimately the threat of global terrorism adds stability to the international order with the United States as a hegemon?
The three main schools in international relations theory, in their traditional senses, have all been formulated around historical examples and trends observed over time. Transnational terrorist threats, however, pose a new threat that has the potential to change trends in the world. The actual size of the threat is irrelevant; rather, the perception on the part of potential peer challengers that terrorism is the biggest threat to the world order might allow for some prolonging of the United States position as hegemon. The rise of the power of transnational terrorist movements, or even just the perception of this rise, increases the attractiveness of free-riding. Simultaneously, military officials in potential power peers of the US mostly face the same threats of terrorism, and states will for the most part want to divert more resources to defending against potential terrorist threats than towards challenging the position of the United States. After the Cold War, it may have seemed as if states, no longer flocking to superpowers against a common enemy, would balance the unipolar system. The rise of terrorism, however, has posed a new common enemy that is more likely to provoke bandwagoning and a bolstering of US power, even as it acts unilaterally and undermines the international system it has helped to create.
I think that the hot topic of terrorism has indeed assured the United States’ position as the hegemon in a unipolar system. Though a tendency towards balancing or towards increased revisionism among potential peer states may have been likely in the aftermath of the Cold War, fear now allows powerful nations to accept the leadership of the United States. In this environment, the United States can ignore international institutions and norms with fewer consequences than before. Sure, other nations will react negatively to American use of torture and to blatant disregard of UN resolutions, but no one with the ability to do so will attempt to challenge the US’s hegemony unless it wants to give up free-riding and take on the position of leader against terrorism, which is highly unlikely given the nature of terrorism. Terrorists are difficult to detect and target, unlike states that, in the past, posed the chief military challenges. Especially as a relatively new concern, leading the fight against such terrorism calls for many resources that no state that gets them for free would really want to take on. Interests against terrorism will cause the United States to carry more weight in international relations as, say, China, a nation much less obsessed with terrorism, and therefore, the unipolar system will be maintained for at least some period of time longer than it would without the terrorist threat.
Ikenberry’s writings clearly oppose unilateral action on the part of the Bush administration. I do not support unilateralism, but I disagree that it will be the demise of the United States within the near future. Ikenberry seems to relate popularity and power in an inaccurarte way. The actions of the United States might not be popular in the world, but most states will not actively challenge the US through force and challenge its power as long as the option of free-riding in the face of terrorism is still an option. Additionally, it is possible that the expectations of legitimacy that Ikenberry sees as acquired through adherence to international institutions can be acquired through protection against terrorism. Since terrorism is currently perceived as a major threat (more so, in my opinion, than it actual is), states might accept the legitimacy of the United States if it proves able and committed to working against terrorism Just as the 1982 invasion of the Falklands islands led colonies to cease efforts towards independence, states weaker than the United States who would have potentially seeked to change the status quo will not because of fears of terrorism and guarantees that the United States foreign policy is currently dedicated to mitigating terrorism.
This, of course, leaves out weaker states that may see the Bush administration’s obsession with terrorism as a threat. States that cannot control terrorist groups within their borders might see the United States’ willingness to attack as a threat and, therefore, balancing will take place as a response; nevertheless, the states in question are weak states and would probably be unable to coordinate well or challenge the US effectively if they can’t control domestic affairs.