Tibet and China

I know, seems like an old story....but China and Tibet were in the news again recently.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080322/ap_on_re_as/india_tibet_seeking_help

(I'm not sure that worked as a link...you might have to copy/paste because I'm hopelessly bad at blogging.)

This article raised a lot of questions for me – I just wanted to pose all of them, propose some possible answers, and then see what everyone else thinks.

Tibet obviously cannot and will not use military methods to fight the Chinese, and their peaceful ways make winning support through soft power a viable and attractive option for them. Do Tibetans have any hope of winning autonomy by simply making powerful friends and putting diplomatic pressure on China, or is this a pipe dream? Will restrained strategies like those called for by the Dalai Lama be more effective than calling for economic sanctions and boycotts of the Olympics by stronger nations? I believe that the Dalai Lama is promoting a smart strategy all around. From the realist perspective, Tibetans will avoid drawing the military wrath of China and will avoid evoking a balancing response by lowering the level of involvement of foreign governments. From a liberal perspective, Tibetans are seeking the support of multilateral institutions, which will increase the legitimacy of their cause, and are using moderate approaches that will attract support from a greater number of allies.

My other major question is: how will China’s rising economic and military status affect worldwide support for Tibet? Will countries that have economic ties to China drop the issue to avoid angering the growing giant, or will more powerful states like the US try to use issue linkage to attach the end of oppression in Tibet to trade benefits or increased power in international institutions? I think that the answer depends on the relative power between the nation in question and China. The US, as a global superpower, can still afford to try to influence China’s actions, and may try to enhance its reputation as a supporter of human rights by doing so in this case. On the other hand, less powerful nations that arguably face a greater risk from China as a result of geographic proximity and historical or regional ties (for instance, India) may be more willing to appease China. These nations might be less likely to show public support for Tibet’s bid for autonomy because, using balance of threat logic, it is more expedient for them to befriend China as it rises in stature than to support a relatively powerless non-state entity.